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Electricity reforms and their impact on ground  
water use in states of Gujarat, West Bengal and  
Uttarakhand, India
Managing the externalities of groundwater use by minimising the nega-
tive impacts of over-exploitation, while preserving the benefits from 
such use, has emerged as the key natural resources management chal-
lenge in South Asia. Direct regulation of groundwater is not a feasible 
option in the region given the large number of pumps (over 20 million 
or so) and the huge transactions costs involved. In this context, an in-
direct mechanism, such as the regulation of the electricity supply and 
changes in electricity pricing and subsidies, can provide an effective tool 
for governing groundwater use. The link between groundwater and 
electricity is rather straight forward – electricity is used for pumping 
groundwater from aquifers. This paper documents three such cases of 
electricity reforms that have had a profound impact on groundwater use 
in the Indian states of Gujarat and West Bengal.
Keywords: groundwater, electricity, reforms, subsidies, Gujarat, West 
Bengal
Introduction
Indian policy discourse on the most suitable form of agricultural elec-
tricity tariff has come full circle. Until the early 1970s, all state electric-
ity boards (SEBs) charged their tubewell owners based on metered con-
sumption, but, due to a whole range of administrative issues, this was 
later changed to a flat tariff in the early 1980s. However, the flat tariffs 
remained low over the years and the SEBs started making large losses. 
Low flat tariffs also led to the over-exploitation of groundwater in arid 
and semi-arid states of India. Therefore, recently, there has been a re-
newed interest in reforming the electricity sector. This has been trig-
gered by the poor financial status of most SEBs. The main element of 
electricity sector reform has been the unbundling of services – that is, 
the separation of the electricity generation, transmission and distribu-
tion functions and the universal metering of all consumers. Almost 
50% of India’s pumps depend on electricity for pumping groundwater 
and hence, reforms in this sector profoundly affect the groundwater 
sector.
 Given that both water resources and electricity are state concerns in 
India, individual states have chosen to implement power sector reforms 
differently, keeping in mind the political exigencies faced by these states. 
The states of West Bengal in the east and Uttarakhand in the north have 
embarked upon the path of universal metering of agricultural electric-
ity consumers mainly because there are no strong farm lobbies in the 
state to oppose such a move. This shift from a flat rate tariff (signifying 
a zero marginal cost of pumping) to a pro-rata tariff, altered the cost 
and incentive structure for the pump owners and hence affected their 
pumping behaviour. In contrast, the government of Gujarat, in the face 
of strident opposition from farmers, decided not to meter tubewells. 
Instead, they separated agricultural feeders from non agricultural ones, 
improved the quality of the power supply and rationed the number of 
hours of electricity to agriculture to just 8 hours a day. This initiative 
of the government of Gujarat is called the Jyotirgram Yojana. Figure 1 
shows the location of West Bengal, Uttarakhand and Bihar.
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the possible impacts of these 
reforms on the pumping behaviour of pump owners, on the informal 
groundwater markets through which water buyers would be impacted, 
and on the revenues of the state electricity boards. The paper is divided 
into five sections. After the first introductory section, the second section 
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describes the groundwater and electricity situations in the three states. 
The third section discusses the process and implementation of the power 
sector reforms in each of these states, while the fourth section analyses 
the impact of these on groundwater use and on groundwater markets.
Groundwater and electricity situation in West 
Bengal, Uttarakhand and Gujarat
West Bengal, an eastern state of India, receives an annual rainfall of 
around 2000 mm and has a groundwater potential of 31 billion cubic 
meters (BCM), most of which is available at shallow depths. Only 42% 
of the total available groundwater resources in the state have been uti-
lised so far (WIDD, 2004). While West Bengal has plentiful ground-
water resources that can be furthered developed, the state has, for 
various political reasons (Mukherji, 2006), adopted one of the most 
stringent groundwater regulations in India. For instance, procuring 
electricity connections for tubewells needs permission from multiple 
sources, such as the State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID) 
and village level bodies (panchayats) and the process is fraught with 
red tape and corruption. The result is that West Bengal has the low-
est proportion of electric tubewells to total tubewells in India (GOI, 
2003). The farmers in West Bengal, until 2007, also paid the highest 
flat tariff (Rs. 2160/HP/year, where HP = horse power) for electric-
ity among all Indian states. Agricultural consumption of electricity 
accounted for only 6.1% of total electricity consumption (WBSEB, 
2006) and unlike other states, where the electricity subsidy forms a 
major share of state fiscal deficits, in West Bengal this was negligible 
(Briscoe, 2005). The existence of a very high flat tariff, coupled with 
small land holdings and abundant groundwater resources had led to 
the emergence of competitive informal groundwater markets here, 
and small and marginal water buying farmers benefitted substan-
tially through these markets (Mukherji, 2007). The main irrigated 
crop in the state is summer paddy, called boro paddy. Average annual 
pumping hours vary from 1500 to 2100 for centrifugal and submersible 
pumps respectively.
 The state of Uttarakhand in the northern part of India was formed 
in 2001 – earlier it was a part of Uttar Pradesh state. Uttarakhand is a 
pre-dominantly hilly state with the bulk of its agricultural lands limited 
to the southern Terai parts of the state. The mean rainfall in the state 
is around 1500 mm. The state has an annual net available groundwater 
resource of 2.10 BCM, of which 66% is being utilised presently (CGWB, 
2006). The depth to the water table depends on the sub-surface lithol-
ogy and varies from less than 2 m in the Terai region to as deep as 50 m 
in the Bhabar zone. Agriculture uses only 12% of the total electricity 
consumed in the state, though nearly 70% of all tubewells run on elec-
tricity. Until 2007, Uttarakhand too had a high flat tariff (Rs. 1512/HP/
year) compared with other Indian states. Though unlike West Bengal 
where tariff recovery is very high (more than 90%), in Uttarakhand it 
is as low as 25% (personal communication with an official of the SEB). 
One of the main reasons for such a low tariff recovery is the high tariff 
rate coupled with periodic waivers of electricity dues by the politicians, 
which lessens the incentive to pay bills in a timely manner. The main 
irrigated crop in the state is kharif (or monsoon) paddy and rabi (or win-
ter) wheat. The average annual pumping hours are only 800 because the 
water requirement of the wheat crop is not extensive. Water markets are 
less developed than in West Bengal, mostly because of the larger land 
holding size, which makes it economical for farmers to invest in their 
own tubewells. Another reason is the wide prevalence of government 
tubewells; we found that almost every village had a government tube-
well and they were functioning satisfactorily.
 Gujarat, a western state of India, receives an average annual rainfall 
of 1243 mm, though with wide regional variations. South Gujarat re-
ceives the bulk of the rainfall, while western parts of the state (Saurash-
tra and Kutch) are distinctly arid. The state has an annual, replenish-
able groundwater potential of 15.81 BCM, of which 76% (11.49 BCM) is 
withdrawn every year. This is a state where groundwater is used inten-
sively and 61% of the administrative blocks are over-exploited, critically 
or semi-critically as per the norms of the Central Groundwater Board 
(CGWB). North Gujarat, which on average receives 500–700 mm of 
rainfall in a year, has deep alluvial aquifers and is a prime example of the 
unsustainable use of groundwater. In many ways, the state of Gujarat 
epitomises the groundwater crisis in India. Yet, surprisingly, the state 
has been registering an agricultural growth rate of 10% for the last 7–8 
years and this surpasses that of other states better endowed with wa-
ter resources (Gulati et al., 2009). Here, farmers have also increasingly 
moved away from cereal crops to high value crops, such as Bt cotton, to-
bacco, dairy, orchard and commercial crops, so as to maximise value per 
drop of water. Gujarat also has strong farmers’ lobbies that have, time 
and again, successfully thwarted any attempts to curtail their access to 
groundwater (Mukherji, 2006). Gujarat, until the recent reforms, had 
one of the highest electricity subsidies in India (Briscoe, 2005). Given 
the heavy losses sustained by the state electricity board, there was a rapid 
deterioration in the quality of the power supply in the state, thereby 
negatively affecting the quality of life in rural areas. Gujarat, like West 
Bengal, also supports a vibrant groundwater market. Indeed, ground-
water markets in Gujarat pre-date those of other regions in India (Shah, 
1993). Table 1 summarises the agricultural and groundwater situation 
in these three states.
Figure 1. Location of study states
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The process of reform in three states
Metering in West Bengal and Uttarakhand
As already mentioned, both the states are in the process of metering 
their agricultural tubewells. While the aim of the metering is the same, 
namely, to facilitate the efficient use of groundwater through marginal 
cost pricing, better energy audits and smaller transmission and distribu-
tion losses, these two states have adopted entirely different processes of 
metering.
 The Government of West Bengal (GoWB) has adopted a hi-tech ap-
proach to metering through the installation of remotely sensed, tamper-
proof meters which operate on the Time of the Day (TOD) principle. 
TOD is a demand management tool whereby by differentiating the cost 
of electricity during different times of the day, consumers are discour-
aged from using pumps during peak evening hours, while they are en-
couraged to use them during the slack night hours. There are three me-
tered tariff rates: the normal rate from 6 am to 5 pm (Rs. 1.37/kilowatt 
hour (kWh)), the peak rate from 5 pm to 11 pm (Rs. 4.75/kWh) and 
the off-peak rate from 11 pm to 6 am (Rs 0.75/kWh). On average, these 
rates translate to around Rs. 6/hour inclusive of Rs. 22/month as meter 
rent. The new meters use technologies such as GIS (geographic informa-
tion systems) and GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) 
and are read remotely (Figure 2). These new meters solve many of the 
traditional problems of metering, such as tampering, under-reporting 
and under-billing by the meter readers in collusion with the villagers, 
curbing the arbitrary power of the meter readers and the physical abuse 
that the meter readers were subject to at times at the hands of the irate 
villagers. Meters are now remotely read and the reading is transmitted 
Indicator West Bengal Uttarakhand Gujarat Source
Level of development of groundwater  
in 2004 (%)
42 66 76 CGWB, 2006
Number of over-exploited blocks in 2004  
(and as a % of all blocks)
0 (0%) 2 (2.5%) 31 (16.8%) CGWB, 2006
Normal average annual rainfall (mm) 2074 1523 1243 CGWB, 2006
Nature of aquifer Alluvial Alluvial Alluvial & hard rock CGWB, 2006
Percentage of electric tubewells to total  
tubewells (2001)
8.2 70 54.5 GOI, 2003
Agricultural electricity consumption (MkWh)  
in (2000–2001)
1360 5122 14507 Mukherjee, 2008 for 
West Bengal and  
Gujarat and ICICI, 2000
Share of agriculture to total electricity  
consumption (2001–2002) (%)
6.1 12.0 45.9 Planning  
Commission, 2002
Transmission and distribution losses (%) 25.9 34.2 (includes  
Uttar Pradesh)
28.5 Narendranath  
et al., 2005
Flat tariff (2007) (Rs/HP/year) 1760–2160 1512 850 Mukherji, 2008
Electricity subsidy as % of fiscal deficit 
(2000–2001)
0.8 10 (includes Uttar 
Pradesh)
56 Briscoe, 2005
Percentage of households reporting hiring  
irrigation services from others (1997–1998)
67.2 N.A., but groundwater 
markets are thin
N.A., but groundwater 
markets are all-pervasive
NSSO, 1999
Average hours of operation of electric  
tubewell in a year
1000–1500 600–800 1000–1200 Authors’ fieldwork
Main crops grown Paddy in  
monsoon and 
winter season
Paddy in monsoon 
and wheat in winter
Less than 50% of area 
devoted to cereal crops, 
rest to cotton and other 
high value crops
Authors’ fieldwork
Table 1. State of groundwater, electricity and agriculture in West Bengal, Uttarakhand and Gujarat
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directly to the commercial office. The meter reader does not know and 
cannot tamper with the meter reading.
 The Government of Uttarakhand (GoU) has installed electronic me-
ters, but it has chosen the conventional form of billing which relies on 
manual billing by the meter readers. No TOD system has been adopted 
here and the metered tariff has been fixed at a low rate of Rs. 0.70/kWh, 
which is even lower than the lowest off-peak tariff in West Bengal. This 
works out to be even much lower than the current flat tariff rates of Rs. 
126/HP/month. So far, meters have been installed for 70% of the agri-
cultural tubewells. During our survey in 2008, we did not find a single 
instance where a farmer reported receiving bills based on the actual me-
ter readings. The reason for this is the paucity of field staff in the electric-
ity department and there are no chances that new meter readers will be 
recruited in the near future. The electricity department has undertaken 
some half-hearted efforts at involving village self-help groups for me-
ter reading, but we did not gauge much enthusiasm for this among the 
villagers. On the whole, the farmer leaders and the villagers, as well as 
the electricity department officials, believe that metering in its current 
form is unlikely to succeed and that the government would go back to 
the flat tariff system, albeit at even lower rates than at present.
Decoupling agriculture from non-agricultural use 
of electricity: the Jyotirgram Yojana in Gujarat
In September 2003, the Government of Gujarat (GoG) pioneered a 
bold scheme – the Jyotirgram Scheme (JGS) – to separate agricultural 
feeders from non-agricultural ones. JGS was launched initially in eight 
Figure 2. A schematic diagram of a generic IT Power Distribution System that is being used in West Bengal (LV = low voltage)
Source: Adapted from Tongia (2004)
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districts of Gujarat on a pilot basis. The early results were so encourag-
ing that the scheme was extended to the entire state by 2004. By 2006 
over 90% of Gujarat’s 18,000 villages were covered under JGS and the 
total investment in the scheme amounted to Rs. 11,700 million. Feed-
ers supplying agricultural connections were bifurcated from the supply 
to commercial and residential connections at the sub-station level and 
these feeders were metered to improve the accuracy of the energy ac-
counting. Figures 3a and 3b show schematic diagrams of the electricity 
network before and after JGS.
 Under the JGS, the villages began to be provided with a 24 hour 
power supply for domestic uses, and for schools, hospitals and village 
industries; and farmers began getting 8 hours of daily power supply, but 
at full voltage and on a pre-announced schedule. Every village is to get 
agricultural power during the day and night in alternate weeks that are 
pre-announced.
Impact of electricity reforms on groundwater 
use, water markets, quality of rural life
Impact of metering in West Bengal
In West Bengal, groundwater markets emerged in response to the high 
flat rate tariff, whereby the tubewell owners were under pressure to sell 
water just to recover the costs of the electricity bill, given their own land 
holding was not sufficiently large to justify the high electricity cost. This 
compulsion on the part of tubewell owners also meant that water buy-
ers, who happen to be mostly small and marginal farmers, had sufficient 
bargaining power over the water seller. That this reasoning is correct is 
shown by the fact that while flat tariff rates increased around 10 fold 
from 1991 to 2006 (from Rs. 1100/year to Rs. 10,800/year), the price of 
water only rose 3 times, from Rs. 300/acre in 1991 to Rs. 1800/acre in 
2006 for summer boro paddy (Mukherji, 2007). 
 However, metering the supply of electricity has changed the incen-
tive structure and now the water sellers are no longer under a compul-
sion to sell water because they will pay only for as much as they pump. 
So, soon after metering, the pump owners increased the rates at which 
they sell water by 30–50%, even though, assuming the same hours of us-
age as under the earlier flat tariff, we found that they would have to pay 
a lower electricity bill under the metered tariff than before. The pump 
owners have, therefore, benefitted under the current meter tariff regime 
in two ways: (1) by having to pay a lower electricity bill than before for 
the same hours of use and (2) by being able to charge a higher water price 
than before and therefore increase their profit margins for selling water. 
It is to be noted that there are only 100,000 or so electric pump owners 
in the state and they constitute less than 2% of the total, farming house-
holds. It is this small group of wealthier farmers who have benefitted 
directly from metering. 
 In contrast, the water buyers have lost out in two ways: (1) by having 
to pay a higher water charge than before and (2) by having to face adverse 
terms and conditions for buying water (e.g. advance payments, not being 
able to get water at desired times, etc.). At the current tariff rates and 
assuming the same usage pattern, the SEB too will lose out in terms of 
revenues, but it may gain through a decrease in transmission and distri-
bution (T&D) losses. The actual impact of metering on the size of the 
groundwater markets (i.e. whether they will expand, contract or remain 
the same) and the volume of groundwater extracted cannot be predicted 
a priori and has to be answered only empirically (Mukherji et al., 2009).
Impact of metering in Uttarakhand
In Uttarakhand, under the existing metered tariff rates, all tubewell 
owners will gain by having to pay less than one-third of the electric-
ity bill that they would have paid under the flat tariff rates, but as we 
found, very few paid anyway. In this state, the main irrigated crops are 
kharif (monsoon) paddy which needs supplementary irrigation and 
rabi (winter) wheat which needs between 4 and 6 irrigations. As such, 
average annual hours of operation of a tubewell are only 600–800. In-
formal groundwater markets exist, but they are not as developed here 
as they are in West Bengal or in Gujarat. The main reason for the rela-
tively small number of groundwater markets in Uttarakhand is that 
land holding sizes are relatively large and most farmers prefer to install 
their own tubewells than depend on other farmers for irrigation. Be-
sides, almost every village has a government tubewell, most of them 
constructed after 2001 when the state was formed, and these function 
reasonably well and supply water to farmers at rates cheaper than pri-
vate tubewells. In addition, the types of crops grown ensure that there 
is not a very large demand for water as is the case for summer paddy in 
Figures 3a and b. Electricity network before and after the Jyotirgram 
Scheme (JGS) 
A1, A2 etc refers to agricultural electricity connections; C1, C2 etc refers 
to commercial electricity connections; and D1, D2 etc refers to domestic 
electricity connections.
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West Bengal. All these reasons explain why groundwater markets are 
relatively less developed in this state. Here, we found that the metering 
of tubewells has had no impact on water prices. Water was sold at a rate 
of Rs. 50/hour before metering, and the same rate continued even after 
metering. In Uttarakhand, similar to West Bengal, the state electricity 
utility would earn less revenue than before. Given the very low metered 
tariff rates, it is unlikely that there would be any impact on the volume 
of water pumped either (Mukherji et al. 2008).
Impact of JGS in Gujarat
Jyotirgram has radically improved the quality of village life, spurred non-
farm economic enterprises, halved the power subsidy to agriculture and 
reduced the groundwater withdrawal. It has also offered some advan-
tages, such as a high quality electricity supply, to medium and large farm-
ers, but hit marginal farmers and the landless. These depend for their 
access to irrigation on water markets, which have shrunk post-Jyotir-
gram and water prices charged by tubewell owners have soared between 
30% and 50%. Table 2 summarises the impact of the scheme on different 
groups of rural residents, including pump owners and water buyers.
 Since over 90% of the groundwater withdrawal in Gujarat occurs 
through electrified tubewells, electricity consumption is an accurate 
surrogate for the aggregate groundwater withdrawal. Government fig-
ures suggest that farm power use on tubewells has fallen from over 15.7 
billion kWh/year in 2001 to 9.9 billion kWh in 2006, a decline of ap-
proximately 37%. Unfortunately, pre-JGS figures for agricultural power 
use are residual figures, containing a portion of the T&D losses in other 
sectors, and therefore significantly inflate the extent of pre-JGS farm 
power use. However, even if we discount the 2001–2002 figures, there is 
still a very substantial decline in agricultural power use, and a halving of 
the aggregate farm power subsidy, from US$788 million in 2001–2002 
to US$388 million in 2006–2007. From this, we can infer that annual 
groundwater use in Gujarat agriculture has declined significantly over 
the same period. True, some of the decline may be caused by two suc-
cessive good monsoons in 2005 and 2006; but there is unmistakable 
evidence of tubewell irrigation shrinking. 
 Finally, the JGS has brought about an unprecedented improvement 
in the quality of life of rural people by creating a rural power-supply en-
Table 2. Impacts of the Jyotirgram scheme on different stakeholder groups
Stakeholder group Positive (+)/
Negative (-)
Rural housewives, domestic users +++++
Students, teachers, patients, doctors +++++
Non-farm trades, shops, cottage industries, rice mills, 
dairy co-ops, banks, co-operatives
+++++
Pump repair, motor rewinding, tubewell deepening, 
etc. (Pump mechanics)
- - - - -
Tubewell owners: quality and reliability  
of power supply
+++
Tubewell owners: number of hours of power supply - - -
Water buyers, landless labourers, tenants - - - - -
Groundwater irrigated area - - -
Source: Shah and Verma (2009)
vironment that is qualitatively identical to an urban one. The new era 
of a high quality, uninterrupted power supply in the countryside will, 
without doubt, unleash myriad impulses for socio-economic develop-
ment and growth in non-farm livelihoods in rural areas.
 However, JGS’s impact on the farming community has been gener-
ally negative. The intensity of this negative impact depends on the size 
of the land holding and the nature of the aquifer. In the depleted alluvial 
aquifers of North Gujarat, farmers who can pump their deep tubewells 
continuously feel adversely affected because the power ration restricts 
the area they can irrigate. But farmers in hard-rock areas are less af-
fected because the amount of water available in their well during a day 
is a more binding constraint on their pumping than the hours of daily 
power supply. Small farmers owning tubewells are happy with the im-
proved power quality although they miss their water selling businesses. 
Landless share croppers and water buyers are adversely affected every-
where because water markets have shrunk and water prices have soared 
between 40% and 60%, driving many of them out of irrigated agricul-
ture. The full import of the rationed power supply has yet not been felt 
by the farmers because 2005 and 2006 were both good monsoon years 
when wells were full and water levels were close to the ground. Come a 
drought year, farmers will find the JGS ration of power is too meagre to 
meet their irrigation needs.
Conclusion and policy implications
India is in the midst of power sector reforms and states have chosen 
different pathways to reform based on their political constituency. In 
this paper, we have documented the impact of electricity reforms on 
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groundwater use in three Indian states. Table 3 summarises our main 
findings, while the rest of the section discusses some of the policy im-
plications.
 While most Indian states have resisted metering of agricultural tube-
wells, the states of West Bengal and Uttarakhand have embarked upon 
the metering of all tubewells. This paper compares and contrasts the 
initiatives of the two states in terms of the processes of metering and the 
impacts of this on groundwater use and users (including water buyers). It 
finds that both states have adopted vastly different attitudes to metering. 
 West Bengal, by adopting a hi-tech approach has successfully 
overcome some of the traditional problems of metering, such as me-
ter tampering, collusion between the meter readers and the villagers 
and lack of manpower on the part of the electricity utilities. However, 
the state of Uttarakhand has done none of this and has deployed tra-
ditional ways of metering and billing. Given their lack of manpower 
and other logistical difficulties, it is fairly certain that metering efforts 
will fail in the state. This is quite unfortunate since metering (at exist-
ing rates) would have benefitted the tubewell owners without creat-
ing any negative effects on the water buyers, who, anyway, are few in 
number. In West Bengal, however, metering has benefitted a small 
section of wealthier pump owners at a cost to the majority of small and 
marginal farmers who have to buy water. The incentive structure in-
herent in the earlier flat tariff system, which encouraged pump own-
ers to proactively sell water, has been lost. The main finding of this 
paper is somewhat of a paradox: it shows that where metering could 
have generated a win–win situation (as in Uttarakhand), the govern-
ment has adopted a very ad hoc and ill planned approach to metering. 
However, in West Bengal, where the majority of the groundwater us-
ers (water buyers in this case) would be harmed, the government has 
taken a well-thought out approach.
In view of this, our recommendations are as follows:
• The GoU should learn from the GoWB example and introduce 
tamper-proof and remotely sensed meters to overcome the prob-
lems associated with meter reading and billing. This will of course 
necessitate additional funds.
• In West Bengal, to safeguard the interest of the water buying farm-
ers, the government should ease the process of electrification of 
tubewells and provide a one-time capital subsidy for constructing 
tubewells, especially for the small and marginal farmers. This will 
lead to an increase in the number of electric tubewells and enhance 
competition in the water markets through which water prices may 
come down in the future.
• Village level governments (panchayats) can play an important role 
in West Bengal by regulating the price at which water is sold to the 
buyers.
The Jyotirgram Scheme in Gujarat has pioneered real-time co-man-
agement of electricity and groundwater irrigation. It has unshackled 
domestic and non-farm rural electricity supplies from the clutches of 
an invidious political economy of farm power supply. Its highly ben-
eficial and liberating impacts on rural women, school children, village 
institutions and the quality of rural life are all too evident. Its impact on 
spurring the non-farm rural economy is incipient, but all the indicators 
suggest that this will be significant and deepen over time. But above all 
else, the Jyotirgram Scheme has created a switch-on/off groundwater 
economy that is amenable to vigorous regulation at different levels. It 
can be used to reduce groundwater withdrawal in resource-stressed ar-
eas and to stimulate it in water-abundant or water-logged areas; it can 
be used to stimulate conjunctive use of ground and surface water; and it 
can be used to reward “feeder communities” that invest in groundwater 
recharge and penalise villages that overdraw groundwater. 
 Elsewhere in India and the rest of the world, groundwater man-
agement has experimented with diverse sets of resource governance 
regimes – using water laws, tradable groundwater rights, economic 
incentives and disincentives – to achieve improved groundwater de-
mand management for productivity, equity and sustainability. These 
regimes have proved ineffective, costly and time-consuming. In com-
Indicator West Bengal Uttarakhand Gujarat
Key component of power  
sector reforms as it affected  
the groundwater sector
Metering of agricultural tubewells Metering of agricultural  
tubewells
Separation of feeders supplying 
electricity to the agriculture and 
non-agricultural sectors
Degree of competency shown in 
implementing power sector reforms
Very high Low Very high
Use of modern information and 
technology in carrying out reforms
Very high None Moderate
Level of impact on  
groundwater users
Very high Low to no impact Very high
Degree of heterogeneity  
of impacts on different  
user groups
High.
Electric tubewell owners gained,  
while their water buyers lost out  
in the process
No impact on any user  
group at all
Very high.
The non agricultural rural sector 
benefitted the most, followed  
by electric pump owners, while 
water buyers lost out
Possible ways of reducing  
negative impacts or creating  
positive impacts on users
Lower entry barriers into ground-
water markets by making it easy to  
get new electricity connections and 
provide a one-time capital cost  
subsidy to small and marginal farmers
Substitute manually read  
electronic meters with  
machine readable meters  
and ensure regular meter  
reading and billing
For agricultural users, shift to  
intelligent, demand-based power 
rationing; charge all consumers  
on a flat rate basis and continue  
energy auditing at the feeder level
Table 3. Summary of findings and impacts of electricity reforms on groundwater use
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parison, Gujarat under JGS has shown that the effective rationing of 
the power supply can indeed act as a powerful tool for groundwater 
demand management. And in so far as metering over 600,000 electric 
tubewells scattered over a large area of countryside may entail very 
substantial transaction costs which JGS saves, it may well be the “best” 
and not a second-best solution to the farm power imbroglio that all 
western and southern Indian states are confronted with.
 However, as it is managed now, JGS has a big downside: its brunt 
is borne largely by marginal farmers, and the landless because of the 
shrinking of water markets and of irrigated agriculture itself. There is 
no way of eliminating this completely except by increasing the hours 
of power supply and introducing a subsidy, both of which will defeat 
the purpose of the entire initiative. JGS can significantly reduce the 
misery of the agrarian poor by replacing the present rationing sched-
ule by intelligent, demand-adjusted power rationing. The equity 
impact on the poor can be further enhanced by providing the daily 
power supply in two or more instalments to respond to the behaviour 
of wells in hard-rock areas. The equity impact can also be enhanced a 
great deal by charging a common flat tariff to all tubewells regardless 
of whether they are metered or not. This would turn a large number of 
metered tariff paying tubewell owners from reticent sellers to aggres-
sive water marketers to their poor neighbours.
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